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Abstract—In this paper, robustness of non-contiguous orthogo-
nal frequency division multiplexing (NC-OFDM) transmissions is
investigated and contrasted to OFDM transmissions for fending off
signal exploitation attacks. In contrast to ODFM transmissions, NC-
OFDM transmissions take place over a subset of active subcarriers
to either avoid incumbent transmissions or for strategic considera-
tions. A point-to-point communication system is considered in this
paper in the presence of an adversary (exploiter) that aims to infer
transmission parameters (e.g., the subset of active subcarriers and
duration of the signal) using a deep neural network (DNN). This
method has been proposed since the existing methods for exploita-
tion, which are based on cyclostationary analysis, have been shown
to have limited success in NC-OFDM systems. A good estimation
of the transmission parameters allows the adversary to transmit
spurious data and attack the legitimate receiver. Simulation results
show that the DNN can infer the transmit parameters of OFDM
signals with very good accuracy. However, NC-OFDM with fully
random selection of active subcarriers makes it difficult for the
adversary to exploit the waveform and thus for the receiver to be
affected by the spurious data. Moreover, the more structured the
set of active subcarriers selected by the transmitter is, the easier
it is for the adversary to infer the transmission parameters and
attack the receiver using a DNN.
I. INTRODUCTION
The explosive growth of Internet of things (IoT) and machine-
to-machine (M2M) applications has created many scientific
and engineering challenges in cellular systems [1], [2]. This
unprecedented transformation of wireless networks will not only
generate a massive amount of traffic, but it will also lead to
the emergence of sophisticated cyber-attacks, which will pose
a serious threat to security and privacy of communications
infrastructure than ever before. The vulnerability of IoT systems
is driven by the strong restrictions on sensors and smart devices
in terms of computational capabilities, energy and power. Fur-
thermore, since the devices exchange information via wireless
communication links, these will increase the number of false
data injections, attacks and information leaks.
In recent years, an extensive literature has focused on the
challenges of physical layer security and several techniques have
been proposed to deal with jamming and eavesdropping [3]–[5].
Spread spectrum [3] is one of the most widely used techniques
to resist jamming by spreading a signal over a wider bandwidth.
The authors in [6] proposed radio frequency (RF) fingerprinting
technology, which consists of extracting RF features to define
the RF identification data of a wireless device. This technique
generates an alert when an unknown fingerprint is detected,
thereby, helping to distinguish an attacker from a legitimate
transmitter. The authors in [5] proposed two security schemes
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for the multiple input multiple output (MIMO) systems, where
the first technique utilizes the precoding matrix indices as secret
keys and the second technique quantizes the channel coefficients
directly to generate the secret keys.
In contrast to eavesdropping and jamming, only a few works
have studied the impact of false data injection via signal exploita-
tion in wireless systems. In signal exploitation-based attacks,
malicious users intercept the signals transmitted by a legitimate
transmitter, infer the transmit parameters that are necessary to
reconstruct the signal waveform (e.g., total bandwidth, start of
a signal and symbol duration) and then use this information to
send spurious data and attack the receiver as shown in Fig. 1. In
practical systems, remote attackers could compromise patients’
medical devices [7] or autonomous vehicles [8], which may not
only cause huge economic losses to individuals but also threaten
peoples’ lives.
The aforementioned physical attacks, in particular signal ex-
ploitation attacks, are shown to be able to compromise orthog-
onal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) systems, which
are widely used in wireless communication networks [3]. In
contrast to ODFM transmission, non-contiguous (NC)-OFDM
transmission takes place over a subset of active subcarriers to
either avoid incumbent transmissions or evade jamming and
eavesdropping attacks. Aside from strategically exploiting the
available spectrum, NC-OFDM systems [9], [10] are also shown
to make multicarrier systems less vulnerable to false data injec-
tion attacks. In this regard, authors in [11] examined the low
probability of exploitation (LPE) characteristics of NC-OFDM
transmission assuming that an adversary is using cyclostationary
analysis [12] to infer transmission parameters. Cyclostationary
analysis, which is based on cyclic auto-correlation function of
the received signal, is the main tool used by adversaries to infer
transmission parameters in different works [13]–[15] that study
security for multicarrier systems. In [11], the authors showed that
the cyclostationary analysis is extremely challenging to do for
most choices of NC-OFDM transmission parameters. Therefore,
one can come up with LPE-centric designs using NC-OFDM
schemes, assuming cyclostationary analysis is the only tool being
used at the adversary. However, it is not clear if this is still the
case when the adversary utilizes more powerful machine learning
tools for the exploitation attacks.
The main goal of this paper is to take the next natural step
and assume that the adversary is equipped with deep learning
tools, which have been recently shown to be a promising way
for solving analytically intractable problems in communication
systems. In particular, the authors in [16] proposed an end-to-
end learning of communication systems based on deep neural
networks (DNNs). They optimize transmitter and receiver jointly
without considering the classical communication and signal
processing blocks including channel encoder and modulator.
In [17], the authors showed that deep learning techniques are
very promising in scenarios where the channel is too complex
to be described analytically. Furthermore, the authors in [18]
demonstrated how a DNN-based system can communicate over-
the-air without the need for any conventional signal processing
block.
The main contribution of this paper is to investigate the LPE
characteristics of NC-OFDM systems assuming the presence of
an adversary capable of utilizing machine learning tools [17]. To
this end, we consider a point-to-point communication between
a transmitter and a receiver in the presence of an adversary (ex-
ploiter). The goal of the exploiter is to infer transmission param-
eters, reconstitute the waveform, and then send spurious data to
the legitimate receiver using the estimated waveform. We assume
that the adversary uses DNNs for estimating the transmission
parameters. The signal received by the receiver is analyzed under
different communication schemes to determine to what extent the
adversary can exploit the signal. Simulation results show that an
adversary utilized with DNNs is able to exploit a signal which
considered to be completely secure against cyclostationary based
attacks at the expense of higher complexity (related to training
a DNN based on the received data). Specifically, these results
show that the adversary can accurately infer the transmission
parameters under OFDM transmission. However, for NC-OFDM
transmissions, the success of exploitation attacks highly depends
on how the active subcarriers are chosen at the transmitter; the
more structured is the band allocation, the better is performance
of the adversary in estimating the band allocation pattern and
exploiting the signal. We assume that the exploiter is able to
build a dataset over time based on the received noisy signals
and their corresponding true transmission parameters including
band allocation pattern and sub-carrier spacing (as lables), and
use them for training DNN’s.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, the
system model is introduced. An introduction to cyclostationary
analysis and its limitations for signal exploitation attacks is
presented in Section III. In Section IV, the problem of signal
exploitation using DNNs is formulated and the architecture of the
neural network is presented. Section V presents the simulation
results. Conclusions are presented in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a system composed of a transmitter, receiver and an
adversary (exploiter). The goal of the exploiter is to overhear
the signals sent by the transmitter to the legitimate receiver to
infer the transmit parameters and use this information to send
spurious data to the receiver. The point-to-point communication
link between the transmitter and receiver is assumed to operate
over a total bandwidth B composed of a set of N subcarriers.
The transmitter can either transmit over the whole band when
using OFDM transmissions or a subset S, which represents
active subcarriers, in the case of NC-OFDM transmission. The
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Fig. 1: A schematic representation of a signal exploitation attack.
transmitted signal can be written as:
s(t) =
m=+∞∑
m=−∞
∑
n∈S
sm,ne
j2pifn(t−mTo)g(t−mTo), (1)
where sm,n is the symbol transmitted on the nth subcarrier at
the mth time slot, To is the duration of one NC-OFDM symbol
and given by To = Tu + Tcp, with Tu and Tcp being the useful
symbol duration and the duration of the cyclic prefix. g(·) is a
rectangular pulse of width To, centered at To/2 and fn = n∆f
is the center frequency of each subcarrier, with ∆f being the
width of each subcarrier. The received signal at the exploiter is
given by:
r(t) = s(t) + n(t), (2)
where n(t) is the additive white Gaussian noise. In other words,
similar to [11], we focus our attention to the case where the
exploiter is in the line of sight of the transmitter and keep
multi-path channel for future investigation. Consequently, we
do not consider transmitting cyclic prefix for the OFDM and
NC-OFDM signals, i.e., Tcp = 0. An illustration of the system
model is given in Fig. 1, where the exploiter seeks to find the
transmission parameters including ∆f = 1/Tu, set S, Tcp and
the function g(·). In this work, we assume that Tcp and g(·) are
fixed at the transmitter and known at the exploiter. Having all
transmission parameters in hand, the exploiter is able to generate
waveforms similar to (1) by injecting spurious data in place of
sm,n and transmitting this data to the receiver. Next, we discuss
cyclostationary analysis, which is the classical tool for inferring
transmission parameter.
III. SIGNAL EXPLOITATION USING CYCLOSTATIONARY
ANALYSIS
While cyclic prefix is useful to mitigate the effect of inter-
carrier interference in multicarrier systems, it also enables an
adversary to infer basic transmission parameters using cyclo-
stationary analysis [13]. Cyclostationary analysis is based on the
auto-correlation function R(t, τ) of the transmitted signal, which
can be calculated as
R(t, τ) = E[s(t)s∗(t)]
= σ2s
(∑
n∈S
ej2pifnτ
)∑
m
g(t−mT0)g
∗(t−mT0 − τ).
(3)
The periodicity of R(t, τ) in t allows representing it as a Fourier
series sum
R(t, τ) =
∑
n
R(αn, τ)e
j2piαnt, (4)
where αn = n/T0 is the cyclic frequency and R(αn, τ) is
called the cyclic auto-correlation function (CAF). For OFDM
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Fig. 2: Estimated CAF (5) at α = 0 for three cases considered
in Table I at SNR 5 dB where τ = τ¯Ts.
transmissions, this function can provide an exploiter with Tu
and T0 [13], [14]. However, for NC-OFDM transmissions this
analysis does not always lead to the correct results. Specifically,
we represent the following example from [11].
Example 1: Consider an NC-OFDM signal with a total number
of subcarriers N = 256 where active ones are spaced q subcar-
riers apart (known as interleaved subcarriers). The transmitter
chooses two transmission parameters q and Tu based on one of
the cases presented in Table I and sends (1) over the channel.
Then, we assume an exploiter receives the signal (2), sample
it at a rate 1/Ts to obtain M samples and estimates the CAF
function using
Rˆ(α, τ¯Ts) =
1
M
M∑
n=1
r[n]r∗[n− τ¯ ]e−j2piαnTs , (5)
where τ¯ ∈ Z . To extract q and Tu corresponding to the original
transmission, exploiter must look at the locations of the peaks
in (5) at α = 0. For the cases in Table I, (5) is illustrated in Fig.
2. Specifically, for all three cases, CAF-based analysis results in
the same plot. Therefore, exploiter can not decide which one of
the transmission parameters’ sets are used by the transmitter. 
TABLE I: Three sets of transmission parameters
Case Tu(µs) T0(µs) q
1 320 320 ≤ T0 ≤ 640 5
2 256 320 ≤ T0 ≤ 512 4
3 192 320 ≤ T0 ≤ 384 3
The exploiter’s situation in example 1 could get worse as the
band allocation becomes more complicated (e.g. when multiple
interleaving factors qi, i = 1, 2, . . . are used in different parts
of the band) for which CAF analysis becomes very challenging.
In the next section, we study how deep learning can be used to
enhance solving problems of this sort. Later on, we will consider
Example 1 again in Section IV-B and show how it can be solved
using deep learning tools and assuming that the exploiter has
access to a reasonable size of training data.
IV. DEEP LEARNING MODEL FOR SIGNAL EXPLOITATION
We now introduce a deep learning approach to signal ex-
ploitation attacks in NC-OFDM systems. As discussed in the
previous section, our main motivation comes from the fact that
previous techniques like cyclostationary analysis [12] for signal
exploitation attacks have been shown to be extremely challenging
for most choices of transmission parameters [11]. In contrast,
we investigate performance of an exploiter that applies machine
learning tools to exploit the signal and attempt to answer the
First DNN
Sampled signal
SSecond DNN
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Fig. 3: Block diagrams of two DNNs used for estimating
transmission parameters at the exploiter.
question that if/when she is able to do so and what are the
parameters that affect her performance. Next, we first present
a DNN-based model for signal exploitation. Then, we consider
the problem in Example 1 and describe how it can be solved
using DNNs.
A. DNN-based exploitation
We assume the exploiter has access to deep neural networks
(DNNs) of fixed input size n, which try to infer the transmission
parameters introduced in Section II. Fig. 3 illustrates this where
two separate DNNs are used to infer two different parameters, set
S and∆f . The exploiter overhears the transmissions between the
transmitter and the receiver. Then she collects samples and the
corresponding true transmission parameters as the training data.
Specifically, we assume that the exploiter samples the received
noisy signal in (2) to extract n/2 (complex) samples r(kT ) and
feed the DNNs with the corresponding real and imaginary parts,
i.e.,
r(kT ) =
∑
n∈S
sm,ne
j2pifn(kT−t0) + n(kT ), k = 0, . . . , n1/2− 1,
(6)
where T = 1∆fn1 and t0 represents the start of the sampling
time. We note that 1/∆f denotes the duration of the NC-OFDM
signal and 1/T represents the sampling rate here. We assume
the transmitter sends signals with different values of ∆f and
uses various band allocations S as subsequently explained. The
specifications for the first DNN in Fig. 3 are as follows.
• Input: The real part R(·) and the imaginary part I(·) of
the samples r(kT ), k = 0, . . . , n1/2−1 in (6); specifically,
the input vector is [R(r(0)),R(r(T )), . . . ,R(r((n1/2 −
1)T )), I(r(0)), I(r(T )), . . . , I(r((n1/2− 1)T ))]. We also
have fixed n = 192 throughout this work.
• Output: Estimated subcarrier width ∆̂f .
• Architecture: There are 4 fully connected layers, two of
which are hidden layers. The numbers of neurons in the
layers are 192, 100, 50 and 1, respectively. The activation
function for all the layers is chosen to be ReLU function.
Note that we also tried higher number of hidden layers
and higher number of neurons for each layer. However, the
performance did not improve in a noticeable way.
• Training: The weights in each layer of the neural network
are determined by minimizing the L2 loss (∆̂f − ∆f)
2
where ∆f is the true parameter assumed to be known at the
exploiter during the training stage. We have used Tensorflow
and Adam optimizer [19] with a learning rate of 0.0005 to
train the model accordingly.
The second DNN is meant to infer the subcarrier pattern. Its
properties are described as follows:
• Input: The same input vector described above for the first
DNN.
• Output: The subcarriers’ allocation pattern estimation Ŝ,
which is a binary vector of fixed size L = 64, where 0 and
1 represent inactive and active subcarrier, respectively.
• Architecture: There are 6 fully connected layers, four of
which are hidden layers. The number of neurons in the
layers are 192, 350, 600, 400, 200 and 64, respectively.
The activation function for all the layers is chosen to be
ReLU function except for the last layer, where the sigmoid
function, f(x) = 1/(1 + e−x), is used to ensure an output
in the range [0, 1]. To see whether a subcarrier is inactive or
active, we assume the exploiter further convert these values
to 0’s and 1’s using the following function
g(x) =
{
0, 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5,
1, 0.5 < x ≤ 1.
(7)
• Training: The DNN is trained by minimizing the following
distance metric:
Dist(S, Ŝ) =
1
M
L∑
i=1
(S(i) − Ŝ(i))2, (8)
where S is the true binary allocation pattern assumed to be
known at the offline training stage. Each element in S is
0 for inactive subcarriers and 1 for active ones. We note
that if |S| < L, we append zero’s at the end of S to make
it of length L, the same length as the DNN’s outputs. We
have used RMSProp optimizer with learning rate 0.001 in
Tensorflow in order to train the second DNN.
During the online testing stage, the exploiter receives signals
with different transmission parameters, samples them according
to (6) and then feeds the resulting data to the trained model to
infer the parameters Ŝ and ∆̂f . Finally, she will use these to
reconstruct (1) and send her own data in place of sm,n over the
waveform to the receiver.
Exploiting the transmitter waveforms depends on the structure
of the band allocation pattern. We consider four different band
allocations in this paper: 1) A single contiguous block of active
subcarriers (OFDM signal). 2) NC-OFDM signal whose band
allocation is illustrated in Fig. 4 where q denotes the number
of inactive subcarriers between active ones and c denotes the
length of a block of contiguous active subcarriers. We refer to it
as structure 1 in the following. For training and test purposes, we
generate signals of this type with q in range [1, 6] and c in range
[4, 53] where the location of c in the band is considered to be
random. 3) NC-OFDM signal whose band allocation is illustrated
in Fig. 5 and is referred to as structure 2. Here, there are two
blocks of contiguous active subcarriers of length c which is in
range [3, 15] and three different interleaved factors q1, q2 and q3,
all belonging to the range [1, 8]. 4) NC-OFDM signal where the
bands are allocated in a random fashion without any structure.
In other words, we assume the transmitter flips a coin to decide
whether a subcarrier is active or inactive. For this case, the only
limitation is the number of active subcarriers which is assumed
to be in the range [4, 44] for the training and test purposes.
In Section V, we investigate the performance of the DNN
models presented here assuming that they are trained and tested
based on one of these 4 structures. In this way, we are able to
see the effect of the band allocations on the performance of the
exploiter. Furthermore, the number of signals in the training and
test data set for each case is set to 6M and 1.5M , respectively.
To evaluate the performance of the exploiter, we consider
the bit error rate (BER) at the receiver when trying to decode
the spurious data sent by the exploiter. We assume the receiver
knows the original band allocation pattern S, listens to the active
subcarriers and decode the corresponding bits. We note that
higher errors in exploiter’s estimation of S results in higher BER
at the receiver, since the exploiter may be sending on subcarriers
that are not considered active at the receiver. Therefore, this BER
shows the ability of the exploiter to estimate the transmission
parameters and send the desired waveform to the receiver.
q c
Fig. 4: NC-OFDM structure 1 band allocation (struct. 1). Loca-
tion of the contiguous bans (c) is considered to be random.
c c
q
1
q
1
q
2 q2 q3 q3
Fig. 5: NC-OFDM structure 2 band allocation (struct. 2). Loca-
tions of the contiguous blocks are random.
B. Utilizing DNN to solve the problem in Example 1
We discussed in section III how CAF-based analysis fails
to infer parameters of a simple NC-OFDM signal. For a fair
comparison, we will consider the same problem in Example 1
again here, and utilize a DNN to solve it. We also study the effect
of the number of hidden layers on the exploiter’s performance
by considering two structures for the DNN. The first one has a
hidden layer with 50 neurons, and the second one has 3 hidden
layers of 500, 250 and 50 neurons per each layer. The number
of neurons at the input layer in both DNNs is set to 768. The
properties of a DNN which estimate the set of parameters [q, Tu]
are as follows.
• Input: Samples of the received signal (similar to the
previous DNNs).
• Output: Estimated parameters [qˆ, T̂u].
• Training: DNN is trained to minimizes the L2 loss∥∥∥[q, Tu]− [qˆ, T̂u∥∥∥ where ‖·‖ denotes the L-2 norm and
[q, Tu] is the true parameters assumed to be known at the
exploiter during the training stage. Adam optimizer is used
with a learning rate of 0.0001 to train the model.
As another approach to solve the problem, we consider a DNN
which classifies between three different classes corresponding to
the three cases described in Table I. The specifications for this
DNN are:
• Input: Samples of the received signal (similar to the
previous DNNs).
• Output: Pˆ = [pˆ1, pˆ2, pˆ3] where pˆi denotes the probability
that the inputs correspond to case i, and
∑
i pˆi = 1.
• Training: It minimizes the cross entropy loss between Pˆ
andP = [p1, p2, p3], i.e.,−
∑
i pi log pˆi where pi represents
the true probability that the signal belongs to case i.
Gradient descent optimizer with a learning rate of 0.0005
is used for the training.
For solving this specific problem, we consider training and test
sets of size 5×105 and 3×105, respectively, which consist of the
signals corresponding to the three transmission cases in Table I
at SNR 5 dB.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We present several numerical examples to evaluate the perfor-
mance of an exploiter utilizing DNNs for exploiting transmitted
signals. We note that the QPSK modulation is used for all the
following examples at the transmitter and the exploiter. First, we
investigate the performance of the DNNs introduced in Section
IV-B for solving the problem (Example 1) that CAF failed to
solve. This is illustrated in Fig. 6 where two different cases are
considered for each classification and estimation scenarios. Note
that the y axis represents correct classification probability for the
classification curves, and L2-error for the estimation scenarios.
Specifically, for the classification scenario, even using one hidden
layer enables us to identify the correct class of the signals after
around 1000 training steps with very high probability. In each
step, mini batches of size 104 are chosen from the signals in
the training set and have been used to train the DNN. If one
wishes to estimate the true parameters of the signal, this result
shows that it is possible to achieve average L2 errors less than
0.1 using DNN approach. We also observe that higher number
of layers results in better performances in both cases.
100 101 102 103 104
10−2
10−1
100
101
Training steps
Av
er
ag
e 
L2
 lo
ss
 fo
r e
st
im
at
io
n/
Pr
ob
. o
f c
or
re
ct
 c
la
ss
ific
at
io
n
 
 
Parameters estimation, 3 hidden layers
Parameters estimation, 1 hidden layer
Classification, 1 hidden layer
Classification, 3 hidden layers
Fig. 6: Performance of DNN in solving the problem stated
in Example 1 assuming that the same transmission parameters
(Table I) are used at SNR 5 dB. Although Example 1 shows that
CAF is not able to distinguish between the three studied cases,
one can use a DNN to either correctly classify these signals with
high probability or estimate the original transmission parameters
with low error.
Next, we focus on applying deep learning to the signals
with band allocation described in Section IV-A. We con-
sider t0 ∈ [0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10]µs, N ∈ [16, 32, 64] and ∆f ∈
[15, 20, 25, 30]KHz in the training and test sets.
Fig. 7 demonstrates the performance of an exploiter (using
DNN) for signal exploitation in different scenarios where she
receives the transmitter’s signal at different SNRs, estimate the
transmission parameters and tries to send spurious data to the
receiver. The bit error rates (BERs) are reported at the receiver
for 3 different cases: 1) For OFDM scenario, the exploiter is able
to infer the parameters without error and can achieve the same
performance as the baseline transmission (where the parameters
are fully known at the receiver). 2) For structure 1 NC-OFDM
signal in Fig. 4, the DNNs are trained and test at 3 different SNRs
0, 5 and 10 dB. The results show that it is easier to exploit the
signals at higher SNRs and lower bit error rates are observed by
the receiver for the spurious data over a wide range of Eb/N0.
However, comparing to the baseline transmission, there is a gap
since parameters are estimated with error. 3) As the third case,
we consider DNNs are trained based on the structure 1 NC-
OFDM signals, and they are tested to infer parameters of OFDM,
random NC-OFDM and structure 1 NC-OFDM signals. We refer
to this case as mixed exploitation. One can see that this indeed
decreases the ability to exploit the signal as one would expect
because the DNNs are being tested on signals which have not
been trained upon before.
Similarly, Fig. 8 illustrates the exploiter’s performance for two
more cases. First, for structure 2 NC-OFDM signal in Fig. 5,
one can see that the performance is worse in comparison to the
structure 1 NC-OFDM case in Fig. 4 as the transmitter is using
a more complex band structure. Therefore, one can conclude
that structure 2 NC-OFDM signals are harder to be exploited.
Second, random NC-OFDM signals are investigated. This result
shows that exploiter is unable to exploit such signals because of
the high estimation error at the output of the DNNs. One can
see that the use of complete random allocation at the transmitter
makes the exploiter estimate the parameters with high error, and
as a result the corresponding BER at the receiver for the signal
that exploiter is sending becomes very close to 0.5
The effect of the transmission rate is studied in Fig. 9. Specif-
ically, we assume DNNs are trained on structure 1 NC-OFDM
signals of different rates, however, they are tested on three
different transmission rates R ∈ [0.3, 0.5, 0.75]. Furthermore,
we fix total number of subcarriers N = 64 for this example. We
note that here rate represents the ratio of the number of active
subcarriers to the total number of subcarriers. We observe that
as the transmission rate is increased (higher number of active
subcarriers) at the transmitter, parameter’s estimation error at
the output of DNN becomes higher which indeed decreases the
signal exploitation ability.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the robustness of NC-OFDM
as compared to OFDM transmissions against DNN-based sig-
nal exploitation attacks. In particular, we have considered an
exploiter utilizing DNNs to infer the transmit signal waveform
so as to be able to send spurious data to the receiver. We have
focused on two important signal features (parameters), namely
the subcarrier width and the subcarrier allocation pattern, that
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Fig. 7: The BER at the receiver when the exploiter estimates
the transmission parameters and send the signal to the receiver
for 3 cases: OFDM, structure 1 NC-OFDM (Fig. 4) and mixed
exploitation. Baseline transmission represents the case where all
the transmission parameters are known at the receiver.
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are necessary for the signal exploitation, and introduced a DNN
model for the exploiter to infer these parameters from samples
of the signal that she receives. Numerical examples have shown
that the structure of the NC-OFDM band (subcarrier occupancy
pattern) plays an important role in the parameter estimation
performance at the exploiter. Specifically, as the transmitter
chooses the NC-OFDM subcarrier occupancy pattern in a more
random fashion, it becomes harder for the exploiter to train a
DNN model to estimate the parameters and exploit the signal.
This suggests that a transmitter should avoid using structured
band allocations in order to protect the system against DNN-
based signal exploitation attacks.
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